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BOOK REVIEW
The Dominican Republic
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1982

Given the limited literature available regarding the Dominican
Republic, this new work by Professors Wiarda and Kryzanek is
published at an opportune moment. In the words of the authors,
"No other study exists that provides an up-to-date, comprehensive
overview of Dominican national life."'
The book summarizes the geography, history, and sociology of
the country, and over half of its pages is devoted to a description
of the contemporary scene, with chapters on the economy, political
institutions and processes, public policy and policymaking, and the
international posture of the country. Rather than dealing with the
book in terms of its merit as a general introduction to the Dominican Republic, this review focuses on the publication from the perspective of its usefulness to lawyers and their clients who desire to
understand contemporary Dominican conditions as they affect business and investment decisions.' The book, unfortunately, falls
short of this standard.
The chapters dealing with contemporary economic and administrative practices contain numerous factual errors.
Oil Imports
In discussing the country's dramatically increasing needs for
imported petroleum, the authors state: "Present energy imports
1. H. WIARDA & M. KRYZANEK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, A CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, Preface at XIV (1982) [hereinafter cited as CARMBEAN CRUCBLE].
2. The treatment the book gives to certain contemporary political figures has become a
subject of controversy in Santo Domingo. See El Caribe, Feb. 5, 1982, at 1 (reporting on
statement by Jose Francisco Penia Gomez, Secretary General of the PRD) and El Caribe,
Feb. 6, 1982 at 1 (reporting on statement by President Antonio Guzman Fernandez).
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exceed export revenues by $100 million yearly."8 While all Dominican petroleum needs must be met by imports, and while the bill
for imported petroleum increased from $247 million in 1977 to approximately $500 million in 1981, total export revenues have at all
times been at least two times greater than the cost of the country's
energy imports.4
Joint Ventures
In describing private investment in the country the authors
indicate, "[M]oreover, there is now for the first time considerable
coordination between the public and private spheres, and even
some joint ventures" 5 (emphasis added). This statement ignores
the fact that throughout the post-Trujillo era the government has
pursued a policy of seeking joint venture participation. In the
1970's and prior to the Guzman presidency the three largest new
private investments in the country were the ferronickel mine and
refinery developed principally by Falconbridge Nickel of Canada,
the gold mine and refinery established by Rosario Resources and
Simplot Industries (U.S. companies), and the oil refinery sponsored by Shell Oil Co. (British-Dutch). The Dominican Government was a twelve percent partner in the nickel project, a forty six
percent partner in the gold enterprise, 6 and a fifty percent partner
in the refinery.
This pattern is not new. It continues a tradition reaching back
to the days when Trujillo was a partner in virtually every industrial or commercial enterprise in the country. These interests were
confiscated by the Government following Trujillo's assasination in
1961. The Trujillo family interests in sugar were consolidated into
the State Sugar Board (CEA), and its interests in a variety of industrial and commercial enterprises became assets of the state
holding company, CORDE. As indicated in a recent World Bank
report:
[CORDE's] enterprises are numerous - 30 in which it holds a
controlling interest and 20 with a minority share - and very
diverse, but mostly engaged in manufacturing basic goods like
3. CARIEBEAN

CRUCIBLE,

supra note 1, at 118.

4. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOB

THE UNITED STATES, DoMimcAN REauRLic (1978, 1981).
5. Id. at 83.
6. In October 1979, under President Guzman, the country purchased all of the shares
owned by Rosario and Simplot, and the enterprise ir now 100% government owned.
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cement, glass bottles, paper, flour, salt, vegetable oils, paints,
leather, metal and rubber products, textiles, tobacco, footwear
and batteries.'

Dominican Government participation in joint ventures with private firms

-

both local and foreign -

is not a new phenomenon.

Foreign Investment Flow
In describing current levels of private foreign investment,
Professors Wiarda and Kryzanek paint an optimistic picture. On
page 77, they speak of "the increasing reliance on foreign investment.

. .;"

page 82: "Foreign investment, as we have seen, is also

growing;" page 88: "[F]oreign investment continues to flow in..."
and with a note of caution "some reports indicate foreign investment is leveling off."
Had the authors chosen to look at the statistics on new foreign
investment, they would have reached a different conclusion. The
World Bank's Task Force on Private Sector Activities noted in its
1980 report:
[F]oreign private investment practically stopped flowing into the
Dominican Republic, after having been one of the main motors
of growth in the first half of the 1970s. From 1969 to 1974 the
total foreign investment registered in the Central Bank rose.
from RD $2.5 million to RD $174 million. From 1977 to 1979 it
has remained completely stagnant at RD $214 million.'
As indicated recently in more diplomatic language from the Governor of the Central Bank:
With respect to foreign resources, for some years foreign invest-

ment has shown itself to be timid in relation to our country for
diverse reasons, among which one can principally cite certain incongruencies between the demonstrated interest of the National

Authorities in attracting such investment and some aspects of
10
our legislation on the subject ....
7. Task Force on Private Sector Activities, CARIBBAN GROUP FOR COOPmATION m ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PRIVATE SECTOR iN THE EcoNoMy OF THE DomncAN Rzmunuc
(1980) (unpublished report) 4 [hereinafter cited as CGCED lRport].
8. CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, supra note 1, at 83.
9. CGCED Report, supra note 7. at 12. A similar conclusion was reached by U.S. authorities. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, FOREIGN ECONOMC TRENDS, DOMINICAN REPUBL c
(1981).
10. Speech by Carlos Despradel, "Reto para Alcanzar un Desarrollo con Estabilidad"
to the American Chamber of Commerce in the Dominican Republic (March 17, 1982), re-
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While factual errors such as these are annoying, an additional
shortcoming is of greater significance: The authors fail to deal with
a number of factors which are central to a balanced appreciation of
current Dominican economic and administrative conditions.
A Mixed Economy: Opportunities for Corruption
Even a "comprehensive overview" of the economic and administrative structure of the Dominican Republic must take into account the high degree of participation by the Dominican Government in the direct ownership and administration of traditionally
private sector activities. In fact, there is a higher degree of government ownership in the Dominican Republic than in most Latin
American economies.1 1 At the time of his death, Trujillo owned
twelve of the sixteen sugar mills in the country. These are today
the property of the 100% government-owned State Sugar Board
(CEA) and account for sixty five percent of total sugar output. As
previously indicated, the government-owned holding company,
CORDE, accounts for a significant share of total output of the
manufacturing sector. The government is also the principal owner
of the country's mines and refineries.
Since so much of the nation's economic activity is in the hands
of the government, the way this power is wielded has become an
important domestic political factor. It can make and break governments. The question is repeatedly asked by all sectors of the population: Is the government efficient and honest in its administration
of the nation's wealth?
In an earlier study on the Dominican Republic, Professor
Wiarda commented on the administration of CORDE enterprises:
Despite ambitious programs and considerable efforts, these
government-run businesses and industries were not wholly successful. Though supposedly autonomous, they were not free
printed in mimeographed copy by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic at 6 and 7
(in Spanish, translation of quoted passage by reviewer).
11. Substantial government ownership of industrial, mining and agricultural enterprise
is not a newly observed phenomenon. See CGCED Report, supra note 7, at 1, 11.
Some years ago Professor Wiarda observed:
As the government's regulatory and development programs increased, the scope
of its public functions and responsibilities also expanded and far surpassed those
of the private sector. The Dominican government is easily the country's largest
spender, buyer, employer and businessman. (Emphasis added.)
H. WIARDA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, NATION IN TRANSITION, at 148 (1969).
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from political pressures and were often employed as a kind of
large port-barrel or spoils system by which government officials
could reward their friends and allies. Nepotism and corruption
were prevalent."2
Later in the same work, he observed:
Corruption takes many different forms in the Dominican
Republic. Some government officials receive salaries without
rendering any services. Outright bribes, however, occur infrequently. [Some observers would disagree.] Most important is the
spirit of fraud that characterizes many governmental dealings the enrichment of favored individuals through the expenditure
of funds for public projects, self-aggrandizement through one's
knowledge of pending government programs, contraband activities, and the receipt of goods, favors, or money through the performance of an official duty. The Dominican military is probably
the greatest offender, but the civil service does not lag very far
behind."
In their new work, Professors Wiarda and Kryzanek make virtually no mention of the government's predominant ownership of
significant sectors of the national economy. The use of this economic power by recent administrations also goes largely unmentioned. 4 This reticence to speak forthrightly about a major feature
of the Dominican economy is a significant omission. The subject is
admittedly controversial; some observers believe the accusations of
corruption at high levels were a decisive factor in President
Balaguer's defeat for reelection in 1978. Under President Guzman,
continuing losses in CORDE and the state sugar company, questions regarding the administration of customs duties and tax revenues, accusations of using civil service positions as pay-offs to
party loyalists, and appointment of family members to high executive office, cause these issues to remain central topics of both economic and political concern. 16
12. Id. at 138.
13. Id. at 169-70.
14. The study touches on the issue of honesty in government in discussing the Balaguer
administration on pages 49 and 68, but the topic of government corruption is otherwise
unnoted. The Guzman administration wins high marks from the authors for having "cut out
corruption in high places, . . ." (at 88). Passing references to the venality of multinational
corporations (uniformly U.S. companies) are found on pages 77 and 78. But the work is
otherwise silent on this topic of continuing concern to both the Dominican public and students of recent Dominican history.
15. In a televised speech to the nation on April 15, 1982, then PRD presidential candidate Salvador Jorge Blanco, who has since been elected to the presidency, devoted substan-
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Some years ago, in writing about the less developed economies
of Asia, Gunnar Myrdal observed:
[C]orruption is almost taboo as a research topic. It is rarely
mentioned in scholarly discussions of government and planning,
even by Western experts, revealing a general bias that we have
characterized as diplomacy in research. Embarrasing questions
are avoided by ignoring the problems of attitudes and
institutions."
It is particularly distressing to note that Professor Wiarda, who at
least addressed the question in his earlier publication, has essentially edited this topic out of his latest study.
Price Controls
Another controversial area of government intervention in the
economy is the role played by the government's three price control
agencies: the National Price Stabilization Institute (INESPRE),
the General Directorate of Price Controls, and the Dominican
Center for Export Promotion (CEDOPEX). Many of the basic
foods in the Dominican diet fall under the price control authority
17
of one or more of these agencies.
The authors touch briefly on two of these entities. The substantial amounts of agricultural products imported by INESPRE
($63 million in 1969 reported by the professors, but in excess of
$100 million in more recent years) are noted with the observation
that these activities "are designed to supplement domestic agricultural production in a way that does not jeopardize internal production or depress the fragile pricing mechanism." 1 And CEDOPEX
"has been created to aid local businesses seeking expanded [export] markets for their products."" No note of possible controversy is sounded.
In addition to promoting exports, CEDOPEX has been given
tial time to the issue of removing corruption from the public administration. Among the
measures he proposed is the adoption of a Code of Administrative Morality (Codigo Administrativo Moral). See El Caribe, April 16, 1982, at 5-A. Honesty in government continued as an issue in the 1982 presidential elections.
16. G.MYBDAL, AsIAN DRAmA, AN INQUIMY mto Tm PovEmrT OF NATIONS, 201 (abr.
1972).
17. Vegetable oils, rice, sugar, flour, spaghetti, milk, bread, salt, poultry, beans, and
tomato paste are subject to price controls. CGCED Report, supra note 7, at 17.
18. CAuRMMLN CRUcIBz, supra note 1, at 110.
19. Id. at 81.
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the conflicting role of limiting and controlling the exportation of
products to ensure that the domestic market is adequately supplied. In response to consumer demands, both Presidents Balaguer
and Guzman have used the price fixing powers of INESPRE and
the General Directorate of Price Controls to limit the prices paid
to farmers for basic foodstuffs. Since higher prices are often available abroad, the executive power then uses the CEDOPEX export
prohibition authority to block this possible escape valve .2 The result has frequently been a decline in domestic agricultural production and consequent increases in the need to import basic
foodstuffs.2 1
The authors are laudatory of President Guzman's effort to
stimulate agricultural development.
Perhaps because of his own farming background or his ideological sympathy for the plight of the peasant, Guzman sought to
redress the imbalance between agricultural and industrial development. He designated 1980 as the "year of agriculture" and
moved forward on a number of fronts to rejuvenate the agricultural sector. 2'
The optimistic tone used by Professors Wiarda and Kryzanek is
unwarranted. The price control system affecting agriculture remains unwieldy and imprecise. Policy is frequently motivated by
short term political considerations; virtually all price control decisions are made at the presidential level. And the continuation by
Guzman of the price control system erected under Balaguer has
worked to the direct disadvantage of the agricultural sector.
The system of price controls has had a substantial impact in
discouraging investment, especially in the food production area,
which is a rural based activity. To the extent that it has resulted
in decreased employment opportunities in the rural sector and
lower income to farmers, it has helped to impoverish the poorest
sector of the Dominican population, since it is there where the
largest unemployment and underdevelopment are found."
20. Virtually all of the foodstuffs listed in footnote 17 as subject to domestic price controls are on the export prohibited list enforced by CEDOPEX. CGCED Report, supra note
7, at 17.
21. Trade Barriers outside the Dominican Republic also affect the country's ability to
export agricultural products. See Russin, Increasing Obstacles Affecting Trade in NontraditionalProducts with the United States: The Dominican Experience, 4 INTL TRAoD
L.J. 43 (1978).
22. CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, supra note 1,at 110.
23. CGCED Report, supra note 7, at 18.
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Migration to the United States
In 1980 the World Bank and IMF estimated the Dominican
population at 5,260,000.'4 The United States government estimates
that 500,000 Dominican citizens - approximately 10% of the population - live in the United States." The influence of this migrant
population is felt in a variety of important areas. Dollar remittances by family members in the United States are a principal
source of foreign exchange nurturing the parallel currency market
in the Dominican Republic, which in turn is estimated to account
for more than forty five per cent of all nonpetroleum imports (valued at approximately $450,000,000)." More difficult to measure
but not less important in long term economic effects, the Dominicanos Ausentes are acquiring modern labor discipline, and these
attitudes and habits stay with them when they return to the Dominican Republic. Significant numbers have earned capital nest
eggs sufficient to purchase a house or small business. The migration process has changed traditional attitudes toward savings and
investment, reduced the tolerance for inefficiency, waste and corruption in governmental services, and created new expectations
and demands for economic modernization.
The Dominican population resident in the United States is becoming a political grouping of importance to vote-seeking candidates. In New York City, both municipal and Congressional candidates seek the endorsement of the Dominican enclave. Salvador
Jorge Blanco, the PRD presidential candidate for the 1982 election, included visits to the Dominican communities in New York
and Washington as part of his campaign strategy. The existence of
a significant Dominican population within U.S. borders and the
continuation of substantial migration by Dominicans to the United
States will surely affect policy decisions in both the United States
and the Dominican Republic.
Yet the Wiarda/Kryzanek study is strangely silent on this
phenomenon. The authors devote an entire chapter to the analysis
of social structure and social groups without mentioning the mi24. Task Force on Private Sector Activities, Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, MEASURES To PROMOTE THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CARIBBEAN

DzvKLoPMRNT, table 1 at 37, (1980) (published by International Finance Corporation).
25. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1981)
at 8.
26. Id.
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of the Dominigrant population.27 In their chapter on the economy
2
can Republic, the authors are similarly mute.

What is the explanation for these omissions of obviously significant and continuing factors affecting the Dominican economy?
Why resist discussion of controversial topics such as corruption,
government intervention in the economy, and wide scale immigration to the United States? Admittedly the study is short (143
pages) and editorial selection of topics of importance is necessary.
But these omissions are not marginal or esoteric subjects. With the
exception of corruption, they are well documented and have been
the subjects of both scholarly and popular discussion.
Perhaps the answer is contained in the book's introduction
where the authors advise: "Finally, we shall look sympathetically
on the Dominican Republic's efforts to find its own place in the

sun, to break out of its vicious circles of underdevelopment, to de9
" (emphasis added).,
vise a more democratic political system ...
Certainly, it is clear throughout the book that the authors identify
with the Dominican Republic's struggle to attain its own destiny

and improve the well-being of its population. The country offers
many positive features to investors and businessmen, and these are
adequately covered by the book."0 To minimize or omit negative or
controversial factors, however, not only conflicts with the scholars'

duty to objectivity and accuracy, but also is a disservice to those
readers who seek an understanding of the full magnitude of the
problems that Dominicans must overcome to break out of the mold
of underdevelopment and to reach that place in the sun.
JONATHAN RuSSIN*

27. Curiously, the authors devote several pages to the American presence in the Dominican Republic. They assert that some 9,000 Americans are resident, and they comment on
the influence wielded by the American population on the island. CARIBEAN CRUCIBLE, supra
note 1, at 68.
28. The only tangential references to the immigration issue are found on page 18 where
the authors observe: "The proximity to North America and the powerful influence of the
United States in the Dominican Republic has led to some 'cocacolaization' of the language
and culture" and on page 132 where the authors observe that the estimated 100,000 Dominican residents in Puerto Rico constitute a potentially explosive issue for Dominican/Puerto
Rican relations. CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, supra note 1, at 18, 132.
29. CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, supra note 1, at 4.
30. Apparently the text of the study was completed before the announcement by President Reagan of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. If this program is implemented by the Congress, it will create significantly enhanced opportunities for both local and foreign investors.
* Partner, Kaplan Russin & Vecchi of Washington, D.C.; Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic; Bogota, Colombia; and Madrid, Spain.

